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Abstract
Background: Pay for performance (P4P) schemes provide financial incentives to health workers or facilities based
on the achievement of pre-specified performance targets and have been widely implemented in health systems
across low and middle-income countries (LMICs). The growing evidence base on P4P highlights that (i) there is
substantial variation in the effect of P4P schemes on outcomes and (ii) there appears to be heterogeneity in
incentive design. Even though scheme design is likely a key determinant of scheme effectiveness, we currently lack
systematic evidence on how P4P schemes are designed in LMICs.
Methods: We develop a typology to classify the design of P4P schemes in LMICs, which highlights different design
features that are a priori likely to affect the behaviour of incentivised actors. We then use results from a systematic
literature review to classify and describe the design of P4P schemes that have been evaluated in LMICs. To capture
academic publications, Medline, Embase, and EconLit databases were searched. To include relevant grey literature,
Google Scholar, Emerald Insight, and websites of the World Bank, WHO, Cordaid, Norad, DfID, USAID and PEPFAR
were searched.
Results: We identify 41 different P4P schemes implemented in 29 LMICs. We find that there is substantial
heterogeneity in the design of P4P schemes in LMICs and pinpoint precisely how scheme design varies across
settings. Our results also highlight that incentive design is not adequately being reported on in the literature – with
many studies failing to report key design features.
Conclusions: We encourage authors to make a greater effort to report information on P4P scheme design in the
future and suggest using the typology laid out in this paper as a starting point.
Keywords: Pay-for-performance, Performance-based financing, Financial incentives, Health financing, Incentive
design, Low and middle-income countries
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Introduction
Pay for performance (P4P) schemes – also called
performance-based financing or results-based financing
schemes – provide financial incentives to health workers
or facilities based on the achievement of pre-specified
performance targets and have been implemented in
health systems across low and middle-income countries
(LMICs). Numerous studies have been conducted on the
effects of these schemes in LMICs, the results of which
are summarised and discussed in a number of reviews
[1–8]. Two issues become apparent when examining this
evidence base. First, there is substantial variation in the
effect of P4P schemes on a range of important out-
comes, such as maternal and child health, utilisation of
healthcare services or provider motivation. Furthermore,
P4P schemes can have positive effects in some settings
[9] – but can have no detectable effects on important
targeted outcomes [10, 11], or even negative effects [12]
in other settings. Second, a review of previous studies in-
dicates that P4P is not a uniform intervention [5]. The
large number of P4P programmes implemented in
LMICs has brought with it a range of P4P designs – e.g.
paying healthcare providers between one monthly salary
per quarter [13] to no financial bonus at all [14] or
incentivising outcomes as different as child nutritional sta-
tus [15] and content of care during ante-natal care visits
[16].1 When these two ideas are taken together, this leaves
open the possibility that the heterogeneous results we ob-
serve relating to the impact of P4P schemes in LMICs
could be (at least partially) attributed to differences in
scheme design. Hence, it is possible that, ceteris paribus,
some P4P designs work well whilst others do not.
Despite the a priori importance of P4P scheme design
on outcomes, studies that conceptualise and summarise
the design of P4P schemes have focused on high-income
settings [17–25]. We therefore lack systematic evidence
on how P4P schemes are designed in LMICs. However,
given the difference in health system context between
many LMICs and high-income countries, and the differ-
ent reasons for introducing P4P in these settings, there
is a need to develop a typology that focuses on the de-
sign of P4P schemes in LMICs. This study begins to fill
this gap in the literature. This paper aims to first develop
a typology of P4P designs in LMIC, and then aims to
use this typology to classify and describe the design of
P4P schemes that have been evaluated in LMICs in the
academic and grey literature. In so doing, we reflect on
whether incentive design has adequately been reported
on and we make recommendations for reporting in fu-
ture studies.
Methods
Developing a typology of P4P scheme design
We developed a typology to highlight design features of
P4P schemes that are likely to affect the behaviour of
those incentivised in relation to meeting incentivised tar-
gets. As our focus was on scheme design; we did not
consider operational questions, such as which types of
designs are easier or cheaper to implement.
To develop the typology, we followed three main steps.
First we identified potentially relevant design features
through: deliberation among the authors, who work on
P4P in LMICs and high income countries, drawing on
their knowledge of the design of P4P schemes; a review
of studies that provide conceptual frameworks relating
to the design of P4P schemes, in particular [17–24]; and
a review of classical and behavioural economic theories
on the relationship between incentive design and behav-
iour. Second, we created an initial draft of the typology
including the design features initially identified. Third,
we refined the typology by reducing the number of fea-
tures by merging those that capture similar or the same
underlying idea, and while populating the typology with
data from studies identified in the review.
Following the process described above, we identified
five main design features, as shown in Fig. 1. The first
design feature captures what is incentivised – meaning,
which types of performance measures are rewarded in
the P4P scheme. P4P schemes in the health care setting
1These design variations are common with many complex health
systems interventions, which are intended to be flexible and give
autonomy to implementers to tailor programmes to the local context.
Fig. 1 Typology for the design of P4P schemes in LMICs
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typically incentivise six types of measures: healthcare
visits (consultation or service volumes), efficiency (aver-
age length of stay, patients seen per provider), structural
quality of care (infrastructure, equipment, drug availabil-
ity in the facility), process quality of care (content of care
during medical consultations, e.g. whether iron tablets
were given during antenatal care or patient satisfaction),
management practices (supervision, use of medical re-
cords) or health outcomes (e.g. child nutritional status
or anaemia levels). The main reason why the type of per-
formance measure that is being incentivised is likely to
be consequential for behaviour, is that providers have
different degrees of control over different types of out-
comes, and therefore have varying ability to respond to in-
centives [25]. For instance, providers have far less control
over health outcomes, than they do over indicators that
capture process quality of care. Moreover, some perform-
ance measures are more prescriptive in terms of the be-
haviours needed to achieve targets. For instance, schemes
that incentivise process quality of care will much more
clearly identify the behaviours needed to achieve a target,
than those incentivising health outcomes.
The second design feature captures who is incentivised.
We separate this out into two elements: whose perform-
ance is measured and who (ultimately) receives the pay-
ment. This can be individuals (e.g. individual doctors),
groups (e.g. groups of providers working in the same
healthcare facility, such as those working in the same de-
partment of a hospital) or institutions (e.g. healthcare fa-
cilities). Schemes that target groups are more likely to
catalyse changes in group culture – which can lead to
socialization or better selection of members, collaboration
and peer-pressure to achieve results [26] – whilst schemes
that target individuals are arguably better at preventing
free-riding [27]. This design feature also captures whether
or not P4P schemes measure the performance of and/or
reward the performance of managers as this might create
additional managerial pressure for performance.
The third design feature captures the attributes of the
incentive payment. We include six characteristics of in-
centives that are likely to influence provider behaviour
[28]: frequency of incentive payment, size of incentive,
whether bonus and salary payments are coupled, lag
time between performance reporting and when the in-
centive payment is made, whether incentives are rewards
or penalties, and how the money can be used. The fre-
quency and size of the payment determine the amount
of the reward in a specific time period. Mental account-
ing theory [29] predicts that individuals would value
bonus payments more highly if they are not coupled
with their usual salary – since bonus payments are then
likely to be considered a separate and additional income
category. Principal agent theory suggests that incentive
size will have a positive effect on performance, with
diminishing marginal returns [30, 31]. The delay be-
tween taking an action and receiving payments is a
priori relevant as a design feature because people more
strongly discount benefits that occur in the future, there-
fore – the longer the delay the smaller the incentive
[32]. Furthermore, particularly in settings where there is
limited trust in the health system, long delays between
reporting and payment could make individuals question
whether incentives will be paid at all. Whether schemes
provide rewards or penalties is arguably important be-
cause individuals experience losses and gains differently.
As described in [25], this is due to loss aversion, as indi-
viduals feel losses more strongly than gains [33]. How-
ever, schemes that provide penalties might have a
negative effect on morale, which could counteract the
loss-aversion prediction [25]. Finally, we highlight how
money gained through P4P schemes can be used. Trad-
itionally in LMICs, additional funding can either be
spent on staff bonuses or facility improvements (pur-
chasing drugs, equipment or investing in facility renova-
tion) or both. Different attributes of incentives are likely
to have differential effects on providers’ working envir-
onment (and potentially their ability to reach targets) or
increase the income of workers.
The fourth design feature is the basis for payment,
which essentially captures the calculation or formula
used to determine the size of the incentive payment. We
highlight three main elements of this calculation:
whether schemes reward each action or performance
above a threshold, the type of ranking used and whether
the payment is adjusted for factors like equity or quality
of care. Whether schemes reward each action (for ex-
ample, each woman who is given tetanus toxoid during
an ante-natal care visit) or a threshold target (50% of
women are given tetanus toxoid during ante-natal care
visits) is a priori important for provider behaviour. On
the one hand, schemes that reward each action are asso-
ciated with less uncertainty than those rewarding a per-
formance threshold – since providers know that each
action is associated with a certain reward. On the other
hand, schemes that use thresholds might induce a goal
gradient response – where individuals become highly
motivated when they are close to achieving a goal they
think can be attained and less motivated otherwise (i.e.
when they are far off or above the threshold) [34]. The
type of ranking is also likely to affect the degree to which
providers respond to incentives.
We distinguish between schemes that use a tourna-
ment design (that only rewards the best performing pro-
viders, such that providers are competing against one
another), those that reward providers’ own absolute per-
formance and those that reward providers for improve-
ments in their own performance. These designs differ in
two main respects. First, they are associated with
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different levels of uncertainty. For instance, in a tourna-
ment design it is unclear to providers whether any re-
wards will be received (since payoffs depend on the
performance of others), which is not the case in schemes
that use an absolute or relative performance threshold.
Second, these designs differ in the degree to which they
create “losers” and trigger loss-aversion. Unlike schemes
that reward absolute or relative performance, a tourna-
ment design creates clear winners and losers, which
might trigger loss-aversion and arguably improve per-
formance. Finally, whether P4P schemes adjust payments
based on equity (socio-economic status of the target
population or area) or based on structural quality is rele-
vant for provider behaviour since both complicate the
reward and reporting process for providers. Further-
more, adjustments based on socio-economic status can
influence providers’ views on whether the playing field is
level, or whether targets are achievable.
The final design feature we highlight is whether P4P
schemes include safeguards for gaming (i.e. individuals
manipulating P4P schemes to increase compensation).
Such safeguards include verification or performance au-
dits, and whether audits are associated with penalties or
naming and shaming – which may tap into social norms
about cheating [33].
Systematic literature review
We carry out a review of studies on P4P schemes in
LMIC to describe the designs of schemes and assess the
completeness of reporting on incentive design within
studies. To identify relevant P4P literature in LMIC we
build on a search and screening strategy developed for a
realist review on P4P by some of the authors of this
paper [35]. As described in [35] to capture academic
publications; Medline, Embase, and EconLit databases
were searched. Additionally, to include relevant grey lit-
erature, Google Scholar, Emerald Insight, and websites
of the World Bank, WHO, Cordaid, Norad, DfID,
USAID and PEPFAR were searched. Two groups of
search terms were used relating to P4P as well as LMICs
– which are shown in Appendix A. The search period
covered January 1, 1995 until 1st of January 2018. Refer-
ence lists of included studies were explored for add-
itional relevant literature.
As is described in more detail in [35], the following in-
clusion criteria were used. First, studies needed to pro-
vide evidence on a health-related P4P intervention,
targeting providers with financial incentives based on
pre-specified performance targets. To discriminate P4P
schemes from fee-for-service systems, only schemes that
reward a sub-set of specified healthcare services were in-
cluded. Second, the intervention had to be implemented
in a LMIC, as defined by the World Bank [36]. Quantita-
tive and empirical qualitative studies with any research
design were included. The following exclusion criteria
were applied. First, studies that assessed schemes target-
ing users or beneficiaries of healthcare services (i.e.
demand-side incentives) as well as those describing fee-
for-service system (targeting all, rather than a defined
subset, of healthcare services) were excluded. Second,
studies that discussed the potential implementation of
P4P schemes not yet in place were excluded.
Using the full-text articles identified in [35] as a start-
ing point, we applied three additional exclusion criteria
for the purpose of this review. We excluded articles that
provide no details on the P4P scheme in question –
meaning that the scheme cannot be identified and it is
not possible to verify whether the scheme is already de-
scribed in another study. We excluded studies that dis-
cussed multiple P4P schemes, as well as literature
reviews. We excluded studies published in a language
other than English. Finally, papers that evaluated broader
health financing policy packages, of which P4P was only
one component – which was not explicitly described or
focused on within the paper – were excluded.
The search strategy identified 34,697 records and
retained 81 articles after full-text screening based on the
inclusion and exclusion criteria of the realist review [35].
As shown in Fig. 2, we excluded an additional 28 studies
using the exclusion criteria set out above. We add a fur-
ther 14 based on a review of references of included stud-
ies as well as one additional study identified through
deliberation with researchers working on a Cochrane re-
view on P4P in LMICs (updating a 2012 review [5]).
Data were extracted and recorded in Excel. First, we ex-
tracted basic information about studies (i.e. setting, study
design, name of P4P scheme). Second, we extracted infor-
mation on each of the design features shown in the typ-
ology. In case of multiple papers discussing the same
scheme, we began by extracting data from the earliest pub-
lication, and where this did not provide information on all
design elements of interest, more recent publications were
subsequently reviewed. We only aimed to capture scheme
design at a given point in time and did not take into ac-
count design changes that might have occurred over time –
even when these were reported. We did not encounter situ-
ations in which publications on the same scheme (referring
to the same time period) offered contradictory information
on design. Finally, to obtain some information on the con-
text in which schemes were implemented, we extracted in-
formation on: who implemented the scheme, who funded
the scheme, whether external technical assistance was pro-
vided and whether any additional reforms were imple-
mented alongside the P4P scheme.
To get an indication of the inter-rater reliability of the
typology, a second reviewer extracted data for a random
sample of 20% of identified schemes (i.e. 8 schemes). We
find that Krippendorff’s alpha is 0.69, which is
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substantial. These results, while no more than illustra-
tive, suggest that the typology was sufficiently simple to
be applied in a reliable manner.
Results
Identified P4P schemes
The 67 studies identified in the review referred to 41
different P4P schemes, implemented in 29 LMICs
(Fig. 3): Afghanistan (n = 1), Argentina (n = 4),
Bangladesh (n = 2), Belize (n = 1), Benin (n = 2), Brazil
(n = 1), Burundi (n = 2), Cambodia (n = 2), Cameroon
(n = 1), China (n = 5), Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) (n = 2), El Salvador (n = 1), Haiti (n = 1), India
(n = 2), Iran (n = 2), Kenya (n = 1), Malawi (n = 1),
Mozambique (n = 2), Nicaragua (n = 1), Nigeria (n = 1),
Pakistan (n = 1), Philippines (n = 3), Rwanda (n = 12),
Sierra Leone (n = 2), Tanzania (n = 8), Turkey (n = 1),
Uganda (n = 1), Zambia (n = 2) and Zimbabwe (n = 1).
The majority of the schemes reported on were in Af-
rica (n = 20), followed by Asia (n = 12), Latin America
(n = 6) and the Middle East (n = 3). Of the identified
Schemes 54% were implemented in middle-income
countries. In most countries (65%), only one P4P
scheme was reported on. In some countries more
than one scheme was reported on. For example, in
Bangladesh, Burundi, Argentina, Zimbabwe, India, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, Rwanda
and Cambodia two different P4P schemes were re-
ported in the literature and in China four different
schemes were reported.
The majority of the 41 schemes were implemented in
primary care facilities (76%), with fewer being reported
Fig. 2 PRISMA flow chart of search strategy [37]. Elements in the diagram above the dotted line refer to work done for the realist review [35].
Elements below the dotted line refer to additional screening done for the purpose of this review
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in hospitals (12%), at multiple levels of care (8%),2 in
schools (2%), or with community health workers (2%).
Schemes were primarily in public-sector facilities (60%)
or in a mix of public and private facilities (33%).
Not all identified P4P schemes have received an equal
amount of research attention. The majority of schemes
are discussed in only one (76%) or two (14%) of the 67
included studies. However, schemes such as the Plan
Nacer intervention in Argentina, the Philippine Child
Health Experiment, a P4P pilot scheme in Pwandi
Tanzania and Rwanda’s national P4P scheme were, re-
spectively, the subject of three, three, seven and eleven
identified studies. The full list of identified P4P schemes
as well as the number of studies per scheme are shown
in Appendix B.
Incomplete reporting on design
The identified academic and grey literature on P4P in
LMICs provided incomplete information relating to P4P
scheme design, and there was variation in what was re-
ported on across studies. The information gaps are particu-
larly apparent when it comes to reporting who ultimately
receives P4P payments, the attributes of the payment, the
basis for payment as well as gaming safeguards.
As shown in Fig. 4, studies generally reported on how
performance is measured, whose performance is mea-
sured and whether schemes provide rewards or penal-
ties. The design features for which reporting was poorest
was the time-lag between individuals reporting
performance and receiving payments – which could not
be retrieved for any of the identified schemes – as well
as reporting on whether or not incentive payments are
coupled with salary payments (available for 7% (3) of the
41 schemes). Part of the reason for this could be that
these two features are not commonly monitored and are
challenging to measure without primary data collection.
Design features that are arguably easier to capture but
were nonetheless often omitted include: the average size
of payments (missing for 73% (30) of studies) and
whether there are safeguards for gaming (missing for
71% (29) of schemes), information on the frequency of
the payment (missing for 44% (18) of schemes) and in-
formation on the basis for payment (missing for 22% (9)
of schemes).
In addition, where design features were reported,
this information was often difficult to find. More
often than not, information on scheme design was
not given in one section of the paper but often scat-
tered across the paper, making it challenging for
readers to get a good overview of how the P4P
scheme was designed. An additional issue for P4P
schemes reported on in more than one paper is that
information on scheme design might only be available
in one of the papers, and this is only rarely brought
to readers’ attention through cross-referencing.
Design of P4P schemes in LMICs
The review indicates that there is considerable hetero-
geneity in the way P4P schemes have been designed.
Table 1 provides an overview of our main findings,
which we describe below.
Fig. 3 Map of countries included in the review. The figure was produced by the authors and is not taken from another source
2One P4P scheme was implemented in hospitals and secondary care
clinics and two were implemented in hospitals and primary care
facilities.
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What measure of performance is incentivised?
Basic information on which measure of performance
was incentivised was provided for all identified P4P
schemes. Healthcare visits and process quality of care
were the most commonly incentivised performance mea-
sures within schemes in LMIC, in 83 and 66% of
schemes respectively. For example, a P4P scheme in
Afghanistan incentivised the number of ante-natal and
post-natal consultations done [10] and a P4P scheme in
Benin paid providers according to the number of cura-
tive consultations completed [38]. A P4P scheme in
Kenya rewarded measures of process quality of care, in-
cluding the proportion of patients correctly given anti-
malarial drugs (based on test results) [39]. Indicators of
structural quality of care were rewarded in 11schemes –
for instance, the availability of waste management and
infection control equipment in a P4P scheme in
Zimbabwe [40]. Management practices were incentivised
in nine schemes – for example, maintenance of medical
records was incentivised in a P4P scheme in Fengsan
Township China [41]. Health outcome measures and ef-
ficiency were least commonly incentivised. Only seven
schemes incentivised health outcome measures – for ex-
ample, a scheme in India rewarded improvements in the
nutritional status of children [15]. Only two schemes
incentivised efficiency, for example, a hospital-based P4P
scheme implemented at the national level in Turkey pro-
vided financial rewards for higher bed occupancy rates
and shorter average length of stay [42].
Most P4P schemes (81%) rewarded multiple outcomes
or activities – most commonly, the number of healthcare
visits as well as measures of process quality of care. Few
schemes rewarded only one activity. For instance, a P4P
scheme in Zimbabwe focused on HIV prevention [43]
tied payments exclusively to the number of male circum-
cisions and a P4P intervention in Chinese schools [44]
only incentivised students’ haemoglobin level. Schemes
rewarding multiple outcomes differed dramatically in
their complexity. Some schemes rewarded just a handful
of indicators, for instance a P4P scheme in Haut-Katang
in the DRC rewarded seven indicators [45] or a P4P
scheme in Haiti rewarded 14 indicators [46]. However,
others are extremely complex, a good example is Brazil’s
national P4P scheme (called PMAQ – National Program
for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality), which
rewarded over 600 different indicators [47]. Often stud-
ies only reported a sub-set of incentivised indicators (for
instance, those that are being measured or assessed
within the study) and do not make it clear which other
indicators are incentivised by the programme. As a re-
sult, it can be difficult to ascertain the full set of activ-
ities that are incentivised by some schemes.
Who is incentivised?
Information on whose performance was measured was
provided for all identified P4P schemes and information
on who ultimately received the payment was available
for 38 out of 41 schemes. Most identified P4P schemes
(76%) measured the performance of health institutions
such as primary healthcare facilities [46] or hospitals
[48]. However, 86% of P4P schemes in LMICs paid fi-
nancial bonuses to individual providers. Some schemes,
such as a P4P scheme in Nigeria [49], distributed bo-
nuses to healthcare providers of all cadres, whilst other
schemes, such as a scheme in Ningxia, China [11] only
paid doctors. It was not uncommon for schemes to
0 20 40 60 80 100
Gaming safeguard
Basis for payment
Use of money
Payments coupled
Reward versus penalty
Lag-time
Size of payment
Frequency of payment
Who receives payment
Whose performance is measured
How is performance measured
% Available % Missing
Fig. 4 Missing information on design for 41 identified P4P schemes
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measure the performance of one actor and provide pay-
ment to another actor. For instance, Brazil’s national
P4P scheme measured the performance of primary
healthcare facilities but paid municipal health managers
[47].
How is performance incentivised?
There was considerable diversity in the way in which
P4P schemes in LMICs designed the payment system, in
terms of the payment attributes, the basis for payment
and gaming safeguards.
In terms of payment attributes, information on the fre-
quency with which P4P bonuses were paid was available
for 23 of the included schemes. Across these studies,
most schemes provided monthly payments, as was the
case for instance in a scheme in China [44]. However,
some schemes paid bonuses only once a year – such as
the Open Performance Review and Appraisal System in
Tanzania [50].
Some information on the level of payment per target
was available for 23 schemes, however, information on
the average payment size as a proportion of providers’
salary was only available for 11 of these. Across these
studies, the median amount that providers earnt through
P4P schemes was 10% of their monthly income. How-
ever, there was considerable variation across schemes;
bonuses in a scheme in the Philippines amounted to 5%
of providers’ monthly salary [51], compared to 38% of
providers’ monthly salary for a scheme in Rwanda [9],
one monthly salary for a scheme in Bangladesh [13] and
Table 1 Design of P4P schemes in LMICS (41 schemes in 29
LMICs)
Design features Proportion of schemes
[Number of schemes]
Measures of performance incentivised (N = 41) a
Healthcare visits 83% [34]
Quality of care (process) 66% [27]
Health outcomes 17% [7]
Quality of care (structural) 27% [11]
Management practices 22% [9]
Efficiency 5% [2]
Whose performance measured (N = 41) a
Individuals 26% [10]
Groups of health workers 3% [1]
Health facility 76% [31]
Health system managers 5% [2]
Who (ultimately) receives the payment (N = 38) a
Individuals 86% [32]
Groups of health workers 3% [1]
Health facility 46% [17]
Health system managers 10% [4]
Payment attributes
(N = 23) Frequency
Monthly or weekly 44% [10]
Bi-monthly or quarterly 30% [7]
Every 6 months 13% [3]
Annual or one-off 13% [3]
(N = 11) Median size 10% of monthly income
(N = 0) Lag time –
(N = 41) Reward versus penalty
Rewards 98% [38]
Penalties 2% [1]
(N = 3) Coupled payments
Yes 67% [2]
No 33% [1]
(N = 34) Use of money
Staff income 56% [19]
Operating budget 6% [2]
Both 38% [13]
Basis for payment
(N = 32) Each action (e.g. visit)
Yes 72% [23]
No 28% [9]
(N = 32) Threshold target (single target)
Yes 28% [9]
No 72% [23]
Table 1 Design of P4P schemes in LMICS (41 schemes in 29
LMICs) (Continued)
Design features Proportion of schemes
[Number of schemes]
(N = 32) Threshold target (multiple targets)
Yes 9% [3]
No 91% [29]
(N = 41) Type of ranking
Relative ranking (tournament) 5% [2]
Own performance (absolute) 76% [31]
Own performance (improvement) 19% [8]
(N = 41) Payment adjustment
Equity 22% [9]
Quality 19% [8]
None reported 59% [24]
Gaming safeguards
(N = 41) Performance audit
Yes (without penalties reported) 61% [25]
Yes (with penalties) 5% [2]
None reported 34% [14]
Note: a = multiple options possible
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twice the average monthly salary of health providers for
a scheme in China [44]. Further information on the size
of payments in different schemes is provided in
Appendix C.
Even though the lag between when performance
results are reported and when bonus payments are
received is likely important for behaviour, this informa-
tion was provided for none of the identified schemes.
Virtually all of the P4P schemes we identified provided
financial rewards rather than penalties. Only one
scheme, the Iranian National Hospital Grading
Programme [48], included penalties as performance in
the scheme was linked to how much hospitals can
charge for patient days and hospitals with insufficient
performance scores were closed.
Information on whether P4P payments are coupled
with salary payments was available for only three identi-
fied schemes. Among these schemes, two reported pay-
ments taking place at the same time as salary payments
– for instance a P4P scheme in Battagram district,
Pakistan [52]. For a P4P scheme in Kisoro district,
Uganda we inferred that payments were decoupled, as
incentivised providers do not receive any base pay [53].
P4P schemes differ in the degree to which providers
have autonomy about how additional funds can be used.
In just over half (56% or 19) of the identified P4P
schemes, incentives could exclusively be paid as a salary
top-up to staff. This was for instance the case for a
scheme in Chandigarh, India [15] or in the Rural
Mutual Health Care Programme in Fengsan Township,
China [41]. In 38% (13) of schemes P4P bonuses could
be spent as a salary top up as well as the operating
budget of healthcare facilities – to, for instance, pur-
chase drugs and equipment. Examples of such schemes
are the P4P scheme in Pwani Tanzania [54] or Sierra
Leone’s national P4P scheme [55]. Notably, nine of the
identified schemes specified how P4P bonuses had to be
split between salary top-ups and facility running costs.
For instance in the P4P scheme in Pwani Tanzania [54],
up to a quarter of the bonuses could be used at the
facility-level to purchase drugs and supplied or under-
take minor renovations, with the remainder to be used
for salary top ups. We only identified two schemes in
which resources could exclusively be spent on facilities’
operational budget – a P4P scheme in Kenya’s Rift
Valley [39] and the Service Delivery Integration
Programme in Malawi [14].
Complete information on the basis for bonus pay-
ment was given for 32 of the identified schemes.
Among these schemes, the majority (72%) provided fi-
nancial rewards per activity. For example, a P4P
scheme in Rwanda [56] offered a financial bonus for
each client tested for HIV. The remaining schemes
provided payments on the basis of a threshold being
reached. Most (28%) used a single threshold. For in-
stance, a scheme in Cambodia [57] provided payment
as soon as 40% of deliveries in the catchment area were
attended by a trained provider or when 75% of children in
the catchment area were fully immunised. Few schemes
(9%) used multiple thresholds. For example, a scheme in
Argentina [58] paid providers an increasing amount de-
pending on whether they screened over 17, 24% or 30% of
patients for colorectal cancer.
All identified schemes provided some information on
the type of performance ranking. The majority (76%) of
P4P schemes in LMICs paid providers according to abso-
lute performance. For example, a P4P scheme in
Afghanistan rewarded the number of first ante-natal or
post-natal care visits [10]. Some schemes (19%) rewarded
health facilities for improvements in performance. For in-
stance, some targets in a P4P scheme in Tanzania [16]
gave rewards for an increase over time in the proportion
of women in the catchment area using long-term contra-
ceptives. Only two schemes (5%) used a relative rank or
tournament design – in which facilities competed against
one another for a given amount of money. For example, in
a P4P scheme in China’s Ningxia province, healthcare
centres that performed better than the average participat-
ing centre earnt larger bonuses [11].
The majority of P4P schemes in LMICs did not in-
corporate equity into the payment calculation to
allow, for example, providers to earn larger bonuses
if they reached targets for disadvantaged groups or
households living in disadvantaged areas. Of the
identified schemes, nine (22%) included some form
of equity adjustment. For instance, in a P4P scheme
in Cambodia [57], healthcare workers earnt add-
itional bonuses for increases in the healthcare use of
people classified as being in a low “socio-economic
stratum” (p.199). Most schemes do not adjust the
overall amount earned based on quality of care. Only
19% of identified schemes – many of which were in
sub-Saharan Africa, for instance in Burundi [55],
weigh provider performance using a quality index or
score to determine the amount of money earned.
Some form of safeguarding against gaming was re-
ported for almost all schemes. In 61% (25) of
schemes, facilities were audited to determine whether
actual and reported performance were consistent.
Studies rarely provided information on who con-
ducted the audits, and whether they were performed
by independent surveyors, which have no conflict of
interest. In some settings, for instance in a P4P
scheme in Pwani Tanzania [54], audits were carried
out by health system manages, who are also incenti-
vised based on the performance of facilities. For only
two schemes (5%) studies reported that audits were
connected to penalties for misreporting.
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Implementation, funding and complementary reforms
Table 2 provides an overview of implementation, fund-
ing and complementary reforms for identified schemes.
Information on who implemented the scheme was pro-
vided for 33 of the 41 identified schemes. Most identi-
fied P4P schemes were implemented by non-
governmental or international organisation (58%) or by
regional or national governments (24%). The majority of
P4P schemes in LMICs (68%) were implemented with
some form of external technical assistance by inter-
national NGOs or international organisations – as was
the case in Haiti [46] Afghanistan [10] and Bangladesh
[59]. All included schemes implemented in low-income
settings were implemented with some form of external
technical assistance, compared to 50% of schemes in
middle-income settings. Information on who funded the
scheme was provided for 39 of the 41 identified
schemes. Most schemes were funded by governmental
bodies (national or regional) (43%), non-governmental
or international organisations (including bilateral or
multi-lateral donors) (28%) or a collaboration between
non-governmental or international organisations and
governmental bodies (18%).
Some differences in scheme design appear to be influ-
enced by the organisation funding and implementing the
scheme. For instance, among the ten schemes funded by
the World Bank, many measure the performance of fa-
cilities in terms of service volumes, provide bonuses to
healthcare providers and include design features such as
a quality index3 to weight performance – as was the case
in schemes in Benin [38], Pakistan [52] or Rwanda [9].
Notably, half of the identified P4P schemes were im-
plemented at a similar time as other health systems re-
forms (such as increased supervision, training activities,
roll-out of health insurance, changes in user-fees), which
substantially limits the scope to robustly evaluate their
impacts. For instance, in Burundi, a P4P scheme was im-
plemented at a similar time as an intervention that re-
moved user-fees for under-five year olds [60].4
Discussion
This study examines the design of P4P schemes in
healthcare in LMICs and includes 67 studies published
in the academic and grey literature. The review identi-
fied 41 different P4P schemes implemented in 29
LMICs. First, we found that while the literature often re-
fers to P4P as if it were a uniform intervention, there is
in fact substantial heterogeneity in the design of P4P
schemes in LMICs. This is perhaps not surprising, given
the number of design choices that need to be made
when designing a P4P scheme – which is common for
complex health systems interventions that are intended
to be flexible to meet local needs and priorities. We are
able to pinpoint how and to what degree P4P schemes
differ in terms of design – which substantiates previous,
more general, remarks about differences in scheme de-
sign from high-income settings [21, 22] and LMICs [5].
Results suggest that schemes differ substantially in terms
of which performance measures are incentivised, whose
performance is measured, who receives payments, the
payment attributes (frequency, size, etc.), the basis for
Table 2 Funding, implementation and complementary reforms
Funding, implementation and complementary reforms Proportion of schemes [Number of schemes]
(N = 33) Main implementer
Government body 24% [8]
Health facility 3% [1]
International or non-governmental organisation & government body 12% [4]
International or non-governmental organisation 58% [19]
Researchers 3% [1]
(N = 39) Main funder
Government body 43% [17]
Health facility 3% [1]
International or non-governmental organisation & government body 18% [7]
International or non-governmental organisation 28% [11]
Researchers 8% [3]
(N = 41) External technical assistance 68% [28]
(N = 41) Complementary reforms 51% [21]
3Often referring to structural quality of care (access to drugs and
equipment, infrastructure) in the facility.
4They note that “PBF pilot projects started in Burundi in 2006, at the
same time when a national policy removed user fees for pregnant
women and children below 5 years old”.
Kovacs et al. BMC Health Services Research          (2020) 20:291 Page 10 of 14
payment (rewarding each action or a threshold of per-
formance, the type of ranking used, etc.) and the exist-
ence of gaming safeguards. This evidence strongly
supports the idea that there does not appear to be a
standard blueprint for P4P scheme design being used in
LMICs. This variation may well reflect the fact that P4P
schemes have been tailored to meet certain policy objec-
tives and respond to different conditions on the ground.
At the same time, it is plausible that some of the hetero-
geneity in effectiveness reported by different studies can
be attributed to differences in scheme design (alongside
other factors such as implementation fidelity and con-
text). The theory we draw on to develop our typology
may be relevant for policymakers when designing P4P
schemes, as it provides some guidance on the advantages
and drawbacks of different design choices. In addition to
these key differences in scheme design, which a priori
affect how individuals and groups respond to incentives,
there are also several shortcomings in the way scheme
design is reported on in the identified studies. There is
variation in what is reported across studies, and import-
ant design information is often missing from studies, for
example information on who receives P4P payments,
payment attributes (frequency, size, lag-time, coupling of
payments with providers’ salary), how money can be
used and whether there are gaming safeguards. In
addition, even when such information could be identi-
fied, it was often difficult to retrieve as it was spread
across several sections of the paper or contained in pre-
vious publications that were not referenced directly.
Given the substantial heterogeneity in terms of P4P
scheme design, we recommend that authors of future
studies pay more attention to describing the design of
schemes they are evaluating. Current reviews of P4P are
limited in what they can say about the effectiveness of
P4P schemes without capturing incentive design, as this
is key to understanding which types of schemes work
and which do not in different settings. Indeed, the het-
erogeneous effects of P4P schemes observed in LMICs,
could at least partially be attributed to differences in
scheme design. Therefore, reporting information on
scheme design is a first step towards understanding
which design features are consequential for outcomes.
Such analyses would be highly relevant for policymakers
seeking to design incentives that work. In this study, we
provide a simple typology that can be used as a starting
point for reporting P4P scheme design in future studies
in LMICs (see Table 1).
This review is limited in four main respects. First, we
only examine academic and grey literature to get an
overview of how schemes are designed in LMICs. An al-
ternative approach would have been to directly seek out
policy documents from ministries of health or NGOs
implementing P4P schemes in order to retrieve more
detailed information on design. The main reason why
we did not adopt this strategy was that we were specific-
ally interested in examining how P4P schemes are being
reported on in the academic and research-focused grey
literature.
Second, to identify relevant papers we rely on a
search strategy developed for a closely related review
conducted by some of the authors. Given that the
two reviews had slightly different objectives (one fo-
cusing on the design of P4P schemes, the other fo-
cusing on how and in what settings P4P schemes
affect outcomes) – it is possible that some relevant
papers could have been screened out. To ensure that
relevant papers were captured, we screened the refer-
ences of identified studies. We also compared the list
of schemes we identified to those included in a soon
to be published Cochrane review on P4P in LMICs
(updating a 2012 review [5]). We are therefore rea-
sonably confident that all relevant P4P schemes dis-
cussed in the academic and research-focused grey
literature were captured in this study.
Third, we did not address the important question of
whether scheme design affects outcomes as this would
have been difficult given the available data. To begin
with, the studies use very different outcomes, varying
from childhood stunting to patient satisfaction or pro-
vider motivation, limiting our ability to compare differ-
ences in effect sizes across studies. Secondly, the degree
of heterogeneity in scheme design (considering combina-
tions of design features) is very large relative to the
number of observations. It is possible that in the future
such an analysis could be feasible – assuming that
reporting on incentive design improves and the number
of published studies increases. However, at the moment
it would not be possible to quantitatively examine the
link between design and outcomes.
Furthermore, we only describe the design of P4P
schemes based on the dimensions of our typology. As a
consequence, we only record selected design features.
This leaves open the possibility that we did not record
information on potentially relevant design elements.
After we developed our typology, an article providing a
reporting framework and typology for categorising P4P
schemes was published [25]. As detailed in Appendix D,
the typology developed here includes all of the elements
identified in [25]. We also report more details on identi-
fied design features and include several additional design
features pertinent to P4P schemes in LMICs, specifically:
whose performance is measured, the frequency of pay-
ments, how money can be used, whether there is pay-
ment adjustment for equity or quality as well as
information on gaming safeguards – which are not cap-
tured by [25]. This supports the completeness of our
typology.
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Finally, as this review focuses on incentive design, we
do not provide evidence on related contextual factors
that likely affect performance, for example the degree to
which P4P schemes promote autonomy. Previous studies
indicate that if employees feel that they have suffi-
cient autonomy, incentives are less likely to be viewed
as an attempt to control their behaviour but rather as
an affirmation of their competence – which can in-
crease intrinsic motivation and improve performance
[61, 62]. On the one hand, many P4P schemes imple-
mented in the African region, were often accompan-
ied by reforms aimed at financial decentralisation (e.g.
introducing facility bank accounts), giving health facil-
ities more autonomy in how they operate [35]. On
the other hand, P4P schemes are sometimes charac-
terised as reducing autonomy, by incentivising them
towards specified actions at the expense of autonomy
in clinical decision making [35]. Although we did not
explicitly examine the degree of provider autonomy in
different P4P schemes, there does appear to be vari-
ation across schemes in this regard. For instance, we
examine how money raised through P4P bonuses can
be used. We find that some schemes only allow
bonus payments to be used as salary top-ups [15, 41],
whilst others allow bonuses to be spent on staff as
well as facility operations [54, 55] – which may allow
facilities to determine how to allocate bonuses.
We have three main recommendations for future
research. First, we encourage authors to improve the
consistency and completeness of reporting on P4P
scheme design, given the considerable heterogeneity
in designs between settings and the potentially im-
portant implications for understanding scheme effect-
iveness. We suggest using the typology laid out in
this paper as a starting point. Second, in order for a
review on the effect of P4P scheme design on out-
comes to be viable in the future, studies evaluating
P4P schemes should make an attempt to report po-
tential effects in a more standardised way – for in-
stance, in terms of standard deviation or percentage
point changes – and ideally examine a more compar-
able set of outcomes. Finally, we encourage authors
to examine how differences in design affect outcomes
within a country. It is not uncommon for P4P
schemes to change design over time, or between
areas, and authors should make an attempt at exploit-
ing such variation.
Conclusions
We find that there is substantial heterogeneity in the de-
sign of P4P schemes in LMICs and pinpoint precisely
how scheme design varies across settings. Our results
also underline that incentive design is not adequately be-
ing reported on in the literature. We encourage authors
to make a greater effort to report information on P4P
scheme design in the future and suggest using the typ-
ology laid out in this paper as a starting point.
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